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SOURCE Rechnoy Transport.

NEW METHOD USED IN HAULING SOVIET RIVER BARGES;
 VOLGA AND KAMA RIVER RADIO COMMUNICATIONS CRITICIZED

TRY NEW BARGE-HAULING METHOD -- Moscow, Rechnoy Transport, 7 Dec 51

During the 1951 navigation season, experiments were made in pushing single petroleum barges with 5,700-10,400 ton capacity by 600-horsepower diesel ships. The diesel ship V. Vasnetsov pushed the barge Pinega with 8,650 tons of freight from Stalingrad to Kamskoye Ust'ye and the barge Terezh from Ul'yanovsk. The diesel ship Krasnodon pushed the barge Tobol with 6,925 tons of fuel from Dubovka to the mouth of the Kama. All barges arrived at their destinations ahead of schedule.

Similar tests were conducted on the Astrakhan'-Stalingrad River Section. In July, the diesel ship Krasnodon pushed the 8,200-ton-capacity barge Sungari along this route and in September the diesel ship Vereshchagin pushed the 8,400-ton-capacity barge Amu Dar'ya. The freight carried was identical except for the fact that the screws of the Vereshchagin were 0.2 meter deeper in the water than those of the Krasnodon. Results showed that in shoal water the Vereshchagin maintained a speed 20 percent greater than ships with barges in tow; the Krasnodon maintained a speed 11.6 percent greater. It was found that the pushing method proved most advantageous when operating in shoal water. The Vereshchagin made the 9-kilometer passage over the Solodnikovskiy Shoal in 1 hour 55 minutes, while the diesel ship Perov with the barge Kara, carrying 7,500 tons in tow, took 2 hours 20 minutes.

PRODUCE NEW TYPE TUG -- Moscow, Rechnoy Transport, 7 Dec 51

Construction of a new experimental "pusher" tug was completed at the Moscow Shipbuilding Yard. It is 10 meters long, has a beam of 3½ meters, and is designed to be attached to the stern of a barge which it will push at about the same speed as a diesel freighter. Once the tug has delivered the barge at the unloading point, it can be disconnected and assigned other work.

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- 1 -

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CRITICIZE TWO-WAY RADIO COMMUNICATIONS -- Moscow, Rechrby Transport, 17 Jul 51

An increasing number of ships are being equipped with two-way radios in the Volga and Kama basins. However, communications equipment is not being used very efficiently. Until now there has been no organized training of radio-operator specialists; also, many ships radio stations are not in operation because of a lack of trained personnel. In some cases, the ship lines have given short training courses to radio operators, but these are not at all adequate.

Radio operators and electricians should be trained by river schools approved by the Main Administration of Education Institutions of the Ministry of River Fleet. However, the only school in the basin's communications division, the Gor'kiy River School, is curtailing its work and none of the secondary schools has announced courses in communications for the new school year. Because of this situation, neither the fleet nor shore establishments will receive electrotechnicians in the coming year and the servicing of electrical apparatus and radio stations will be done haphazardly.

Ship-to-shore communications are being carried out very unsatisfactorily. According to the schedule approved by Glavsvyaz' (Main Administration of Communications), all shore radio stations on the Volga and Kama work at various times. For example, at Astrakhan' the radio operates 24 hours daily, at Saratov, four times daily for periods of one hour, at Kuybyshev, constantly during the day, but only 15 minutes per hour at night, etc. All shore stations operate at different wave lengths and have their own operating procedures and methods of radio traffic.

Even the ineffective schedule set up by Glavsvyaz' is completely ignored and Glavsvyaz' makes no effort to enforce it. The navigation season had scarcely begun when the local communications centers started to replace their radio sets with less powerful ones and to change the wave lengths and the time and methods of contacting ships. These changes were so widespread that the ships' radio operators simply could not make use of these radio contacts and the schedule, as such, ceased to exist. Even such a simple yet important type of communication as radio communication with ships waiting at anchorage became so involved and complicated because of the various wave lengths that the communications broke down. For example, the Kuybyshev anchorage radio station arbitrarily changed its wave length without even informing the communications center. As a result, the entire transit fleet in this area could not communicate with the city.

Ship operators do not have any standing order of work and it is difficult to set one up as it is necessary for them to conform to operations of the various zones they enter.

One of the main reasons for the lack of organization in radio communications is that this problem has been decided by the individual ship lines according to the line's own interests. Each ship line sets up a radio network within the area of its activity to satisfy its own requirements without coordinating its work with the needs of other lines. Questions of radio communications are hastily decided without submitting a single over-all plan since Glavsvyaz' itself does not have an over-all plan. For example, the Volga Freight and Passenger Ship Line, which has no need for the Yaroslavl' radio station, had the station closed this year despite the fact that many of the ships of the Volga-tanker Ship Line and the Volga Freight Ship Line operating in this area need a shore station here very much. The Volga Freight and Passenger Ship Line also has no need for the radio station at Kamskoye Ust'ye, and so decreased the station's capacity 20 times, while the numerous ships of the Volgatanker, Volga Freight, and Kama ship lines were denied the use of dependable communications with this important point. In Chistopol' and Derbeshkinskiy the radio stations were completely shut down.

- 2 -

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Another important reason for the lack of organization in radio communications is that heads of Glavsvyaz' rarely visit communications centers and other line organizations. Samylin, chief of Glavsvyaz', has not visited Astrakhan' since 1943 and Sukhov, his deputy, has not visited Astrakhan' since 1944. Many heads of Glavsvyaz' have never been to the Volga and are thus not in a position to solve practical problems which arise in connection with ship and shore radio communications.

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- 3 -

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